What is Said

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Abstract

In the sixties and seventies two important developments in the philosophy of language relied on the intuitive concepts of what a person says, and what is said by an utterance. Referentialists drew on this concept to support the idea that statements containing names, indexicals and demonstratives express singular propositions, involving the individuals referred to, rather than modes of presentation of them. Grice saw what is said as the basic input to reasoning about implicatures. But the referentialist conception of what is said doesn’t seem to meet Grice’s needs, since utterances that express the same singular proposition can carry different implicatures. We develop an account of what is said that honors the insights of both referentialism and Grice’s theory of implicatures.

1. The Importance of What is Said

The nineteen sixties and seventies were exciting times for the philosophy of language. There was the “referential revolution”: work by Saul Kripke, Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, and others led to a shift in thinking about reference. Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures provided a powerful new way of thinking about pragmatics, which has had deep influences not only in the philosophy of language but also in linguistics and artificial intelligence.

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Both of these developments relied on the more or less common sense notion of what a person says, or what is said by an utterance. For Grice, recognition of what is said is the ‘input’ to reasoning about implicatures:

He has said that $p$; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, …; he could not be doing this unless he thought that $q$; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that $q$ is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that $q$; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that $q$; and so he has implicated that $q$. (Grice, 1967a/1989, 31.)

Kaplan explicitly grounds the key concept of the content of an utterance in the concept of what is said:

Suppose I point at Paul and say,

He now lives in Princeton, New Jersey.

Call what I said---i.e, the content of my utterance, the proposition expressed---‘Pat’. Is Pat true or false? True! Suppose that unknown to me, Paul had moved to Santa Monica last week. Would Pat have then been true or false? False! Now, the tricky case: Suppose that Paul and Charles had each disguised themselves as the other and had switched places. If that had happened, and I had uttered as I did, then the proposition I would have expressed would have been false. But in that possible context the proposition I would have expressed is not Pat. That is easy to see because the proposition I would have expressed, had I pointed to Charles instead of Paul---call this proposition ‘Mike’---not only would have been false but actually is false. Pat, I would claim, would still be true in the circumstances of the envisaged possible context provided that Paul---in whatever costume he appeared---were still residing in Princeton. (Kaplan, Demonstratives, 512--513).

Kaplan here grounds the more or less technical phrases ‘the content of an utterance’ and ‘the proposition expressed by an utterance’ in our ordinary concept of what is said. He assumes that we will have intuitive judgments about what is said that correspond with his. First of all, we will take it that in the original case he designates Paul, because Paul meets the condition of the person he is pointing to, and that what he says, Pat, will be true if Paul lives in Princeton, but false if he lives in Santa Monica. Second, we will take it that in the tricky case, he designates Charles, because he points to him, even though he thinks he is pointing at Paul; and that what he says, Mike, is false given that Charles does not live in Princeton.
All of these assumptions are consistent with Pat and Mike being the same proposition, viz.,

Erin: that the person to whom the speaker points lives in Princeton.\(^1\)

But Kaplan thinks we will also find it plausible that Pat is not Mike, and neither of them is Erin. We should be convinced by the fact that they differ in their counterfactual properties. Pat is true in the original case, in which Kaplan points to Paul and Paul lives in New Jersey. But it is also true in the tricky case, in which both Mike and Erin are false. Mike is false in the original case, in which Pat and Erin are true, as well as in the tricky case. So Pat is not Mike, and neither of them is Erin. If we take Pat to be the singular proposition that Paul lives in Princeton, and Mike to be the singular proposition that Charles lives there, we get the right results.

Thus we have an argument that what is said is a singular proposition about the object designated, rather than a proposition that incorporates the identifying condition --- here being the person the speaker points to. And it is our concept of what is said, so understood, that grounds the concepts of the proposition expressed by an utterance and the content of an utterance.

2. A Dilemma About What is Said

The situation in the sixties and seventies seems then to have been quite propitious. Gricean pragmatics rested on a concept of what is said, as the input to pragmatic reasoning. Referential semantics supplied a clear and well-argued account of what is said. Referential semantics seemed to supply what Gricean pragmatics needs.

But there is a problem. The concept of what is said as referential content does not seem to work for Gricean pragmatics; some ‘finer-grained’ notion is needed. Suppose a group of strangers is having a meal at a soup kitchen, staffed by volunteers. Someone has spilled the salt and failed to clean it up. “Whoever spilled the salt, must clean it up,” the volunteer waiter says. Elwood stands up and says, “I spilled the salt”. He implicates that he will clean it up. But if he stood up and said, “Elwood spilled the salt,” he would not have implicated this, but implicated instead that he had not done it, and had no intention of cleaning it up. The relevant difference

\(^1\) For the sake of simplicity, we are leaving aside the meaning and contents of ‘now’.
seems to be the identifying conditions associated with the term Elwood used to refer to himself. The character of the word ‘I’, that it refers to the speaker, seems to be just the element involved in the first case, that generates the implicature; Elwood’s implicature relies on the fact the hearers will realize that the speaker is the person who, according to the speaker, spilled the salt. In the second case, he relies on their lack of knowledge that the speaker is the referent of his use of ‘Elwood’. The effect of these different ways of referring to Elwood, are just what singular propositions lose track of.

Or consider an elaboration on Kaplan’s own case --- the second, tricky case. Elwood wants to know where Charles lives. We all think that Kaplan is unusually knowledgeable about where his philosophical colleagues reside. Kaplan says, pointing to Charles, thinking he is Paul, “He lives in Princeton.” If you say, pointing at Charles, “Kaplan said that man lives in Princeton,” you may implicate that Kaplan did not realize that he was pointing to Charles. If you merely say, “Kaplan said that Charles lives in Princeton,” you do not implicate this, and indeed most likely convey that there was no reason to doubt that Kaplan knew of whom he was speaking. The different manners in which you report what Kaplan said allow for different implicatures. But if in both cases what you said is simply that Kaplan said Mike, and what is said is the input to implicative reasoning, how can this be so?

So we seem to have a dilemma about what is said. It can be coarse-grained, and fit the arguments and serve the needs of referentialism. Or it can be fine-grained, and fit the examples and serve the needs of Gricean pragmatics.

We shall argue that the dilemma is only apparent. Or, more cautiously, we argue that there is a single account of saying and what is said, that both preserves the referentialist identification of what is said with referential content, and explains how what is said is, if not precisely the input to, a major constraint upon, Gricean reasoning.

3. Saying-Reports as Contextual Classifications of Content

We shall not take issue with the idea that the phrase “what is said” can be regarded as designating a proposition. But, unlike typical singular terms, the nominals ‘what is said’, or ‘what he said’ are closely related to interrogatives: ‘What was said?’ or ‘what did he say?’ Such questions are typi-
cally questions about particular utterances, or a circumscribed set of utter-
ances, such as those that occur in a conversation. Further, such questions
are typically focused on certain subject matter, as when one asks, “What
did he say about me?,” or “What did he say about Obama?” or “What did
he say about San Sebastian?” The fact that specifying “what is said” is
typically tied to answering questions with such foci is the key to under-
standing some of the complexities of our concept of what is said.

We’ll consider an extended example concerning a conversation about
San Sebastian. First, a brief geography lesson. San Sebastian is a city in
the Basque Country, home of the University of the Basque Country, site of
many conferences in the philosophy of language and related areas of lin-
guistics, rhetoric and cognitive science. The name ‘San Sebastian’ is an
anglicized version of the Spanish name for the city, ‘San Sebastián’;
Basques prefer to call the city ‘Donostia’ whenever practical. Thus,

(1) Donostia and San Sebastian are the same city.

Now imagine the following. A group of philosophers and linguists are
on their way to a conference. Most of them are veterans, and know that
Donostia and San Sebastian are the same city. Further, they regularly refer
to this city as ‘Donostia’ when they are in the Basque Country. But one of
them, the linguist Ivan, does not know this; this is his first trip to the
Basque Country. All of the conference materials he looked at referred to
the site of the conference as ‘San Sebastian’. As the bus travels from the
Hondarribia airport to the city, Ivan is struck by the fact that, according
to the signs along the road, San Sebastian and Donostia, a city he’d never
heard of, were exactly the same distance from the airport, first fifteen kilo-
meters, then ten, then seven, then three, and so on.

During the trip Ivan muses out loud, saying “This bus is going to San
Sebastian,” and “This bus is not going to Donostia.” The following are
intuitively true reports about what Ivan said:

(2) Ivan said that the bus is going to San Sebastian.

(3) Ivan did not say that the bus is not going to San Sebastian.

(4) Ivan said that the bus is not going to Donostia.

(5) Ivan did not say that the bus is going to Donostia.

Suppose, for example, that Tom overhears Ivan’s musings, and then pro-
vides the other veterans with reports (2) – (5). His hearers would grasp the
situation; that Ivan has two notions of the same city that are unlinked in his mind. One of these notions is associated with the name ‘San Sebastian’, the other with the name ‘Donostia’. They would assume that Tom’s reports (2) and (3) were based on utterances using the name ‘San Sebastian,’ while (4) and (5) were based on reports using ‘Donostia’.

Now imagine a somewhat different situation. Because of his high energy level, Ivan is put in charge of finding the right bus for the group to take to the conference. The veterans are sure the information he needs will be available under the name “San Sebastián”. The tired, jaded veterans hop on the bus to which Ivan directs them. But after a while, for reasons that need not concern us, they begin to worry about whether they are on the right bus. They send Tom to check. At first Tom forgets that Ivan is not a veteran, and asks, “Is this bus going to Donostia”. Ivan says, “This bus is not going to Donostia.” Then Tom remembers that Ivan is likely ignorant of (1), and asks, “Is this bus going to San Sebastian?” Ivan replies, “This bus is going to San Sebastian”.

Tom returns to the veterans and says:

(6) Ivan said that the bus is going to Donostia

It seems to us that, in this context, (6) is intuitively correct, and in fact true, and if Tom had uttered (4) it would have been incorrect, and arguably untrue.

To make sense of our intuitions, we introduce two contextual considerations. The first is the difference between using saying-reports as explanations and using them as information (about the subject-matter).

What a sincere person says reveals something about the state of their minds, states which may explain various things they do or don’t do. Suppose for example that the bus passes a sign that says

Free Drinks for Linguists at Noam’s Bar in Donostia

Tom sees the sign, and says to Ivan, “Hey, that’s good news!” Ivan replies, “But this bus isn’t going to Donostia”. Tom reports to the other veterans, “Ivan says this bus isn’t going to Donostia. That’s why he wasn’t cheered

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2 Henceforth we ignore the difference between the Spanish and English names, although it wouldn’t be hard to come up with examples where it was relevant.
3 We use ‘context’ in the sense of properties of an utterance that are relevant to understanding, rather than in Kaplan’s technical sense of a quadruple of agent, location, time and world.
up by the sign about Noam’s bar.” Tom is providing a saying-report as an explanation of Ivan’s behavior, or lack thereof.

But when a person is sincere and knowledgeable, what they say can also provide information about the world, about the object they are talking about. Ivan is knowledgeable about where the bus is going, since he is the one that checked the sign on the front before getting on board. When Tom is sent to check on where the bus is going, and reports back with (6), he is providing a saying-report as information.

Both uses of saying-reports get complicated when a person has two notions of the same thing without realizing it. When Ivan sees the sign about free drinks, it affects his beliefs about Donostia, but not all of his beliefs about Donostia; only those that involve his ‘Donostia’ associated notion. This is a notion of the city he acquired when he first saw the mileage signs. The beliefs that involve this notion are about the city, in that it is facts about the city that determine whether they are true or false.

His other notion of the city, the one that is associated with the name ‘San Sebastian’, was acquired years ago, when Ivan took geography in school. His recent reading of conference materials has resulted in a lot of new beliefs about the city involving this notion: that it is where the conference is being held; that it is an attractive city on a bay; and so forth.

The beliefs Ivan has that involve his ‘Donostia’ notion and those that involve his ‘San Sebastian’ notion are insulated from one another, both in terms of explanation and information. The belief Ivan has, that explains his lack of euphoria on learning of free drinks at Noam’s bar, is the one he would express with “This bus is not going to Donostia.” When Tom uses saying-report (4) to explain the lack of euphoria, the veterans infer a belief involving Ivan’s ‘Donostia’ notion, and it is this belief that does the explanatory work.

On the other hand, Ivan is a good guide to where the bus is going, only when he is drawing on the beliefs he has that involve his ‘San Sebastian’ notion. It was a ‘San Sebastian’ sign on the bus that led to the key beliefs; it is only his assertions involving the name ‘San Sebastian’ that are a good guide to these beliefs.

This leads to our second contextually important factor, which we call a ‘conversational thread.’ A thread is part of a larger name-notion network. Such a network begins with an origin, in this case the city of San Sebastian/Donostia, and extends through utterances, perceptions of utterances,
notions formed on the basis of such perceptions, and then further utterances. At some point the city was named ‘Donostia’; people called it that for centuries; eventually a sign was put up along the road, ‘Donostia: 15 km.’; Ivan saw the sign; he formed a notion of the city; his notion guided his utterances to Tom. Similarly with ‘San Sebastian’; this network intersected with Ivan in school, led to his ‘San Sebastian’ notion, and all the beliefs associated with it lead to the utterances in which Ivan uses this name.

The ‘San Sebastian’ and the ‘Donostia’ networks have the same origin, the city, and intersect in many places, as in the minds of the English speaking residents, and the minds of the veterans; when they hear or read something using the name ‘San Sebastian’ or using the name ‘Donostia’, the information gets associated with the same notion, one that is associated with both names. But in Ivan’s head there are two threads; one through his ‘Donostia’ notion, and one through his ‘San Sebastian’ notion.

When Tom tells the veterans what Ivan said, he is implicitly talking about what Ivan said along a conversational thread. When he reports (4), using the report as an explanation, he is implicitly talking about the thread that goes through Ivan’s Donostia notion, and through Ivan’s utterances that use the name ‘Donostia’. He is telling the veterans, more or less, “if you follow the thread back from my current utterance to Ivan’s ‘Donostia’ using utterances, you’ll find one the content of which is that this bus isn’t going to Donostia.” This thread is relevant because the report is provided as an explanation of Ivan’s lack of euphoria at seeing a sign with good news expressed using the term ‘Donostia’.

On the other hand, when Tom reassures the veterans that the bus is going to Donostia, using (6), he is in effect telling them that if they follow the thread that leads back from his use of ‘Donostia’ to Ivan’s use of ‘San Sebastian’, they will find an utterance whose content is that the bus is going to Donostia. This thread is relevant because Ivan’s information about the bus was gained from a destination sign on the front that used the name ‘San Sebastian’.

We can now provide an account of saying-reports that is modeled on the Crimmins-Perry analysis of belief reports. In that theory, belief reports were taken to be about contextually determined notions or types of notions, in the mind of the believer. These were unarticulated constituents of the content of the belief report. Here we take threads running through notions

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and utterances of the sayer\textsuperscript{6}, to the minds and utterances of the reporter to be contextually determined unarticulated constituents of the saying-report.

Where \( u \) is a saying-report of the form “X said that S”, we use \( u_S \) for the subutterance of ‘S’.

A report \( u \) of “X said that S,” about thread \( T \), is true, iff:

a) there is an utterance \( u' \) that lies along \( T \), and \( u \) is about \( u' \).

b) ‘X’ in \( u \) designates the agent of \( u' \);

c) the content of \( u' \) = the content of \( u_S \).

When Tom is using his reports as explanation, (4) and (5) are true. Context determines that he is talking about the thread that runs through Ivan’s ‘Donostia’ notion. Along the ‘Donostia’ thread, there are no utterances with the content that the bus is going to Donostia, and there is one with the content that the bus is not going to Donostia. When Tom uses them as evidence, he is talking about the ‘San Sebastian’ thread. (4) and (5) are false and (6) is true; there is an utterance along the ‘San Sebastian’ thread that has the content that the bus is going to Donostia.

Earlier, in introducing the example, we said that Tom’s utterance of (4) seemed intuitively true. Consider the context of our remark. We had just introduced an example that called attention to Ivan’s possessing two un-linked notions of the same city. Then we imagined Tom reporting what he had heard Ivan saying to himself. In this context, it was natural to take Tom’s reports as explanations, or at least as a way of conveying to the veterans that Ivan hadn’t grasped (1). That is, it was natural to take Tom’s utterance as concerning the thread that ran through his Donostia-notion; along that thread there was no utterance to the effect that the bus was going to San Sebastian, so his report was true.

\textsuperscript{6} When discussing saying-reports, we use the somewhat unfamiliar ‘the sayer’ rather than ‘the speaker’, since both the sayer and the reporter are speakers.
4. The Classificatory Role of Content

If this account, or something like it, is the right way to look at saying-reports, what does this imply about the claim that “what is said” is referential content? We think that it supports the claim, as long as we understand the role of the referential content, what is said, correctly.

It is misleading to think of a saying-report as simply a report of a relation that does or does not hold between the sayer and a certain object, one which happens to be a proposition. The job of the proposition is a bit more subtle. It plays a role in identifying a property the sayer does or does not have. A saying-report is a way of classifying an agent by the property of having produced an assertive utterance with certain truth-conditions. But not just any utterance will do. Context can constrain which conversation, or which part of a conversation, the utterance has to have been a part of, and along which track in that conversation the utterance must have lain.

That is, the job of the truth conditions of the embedded sentence in the saying-report is to tell us something about the sayer’s utterance in addition to the conditions it has to meet to be contextually relevant. In the case of Ivan and Noam’s bar, the issue was whether Ivan believed, via some notion that was associated with being the place the bus was headed, that it was the site of Noam’s bar. Assuming that Ivan saw and believed the sign, there will be associated with his ‘Donostia’ notion, the property of being the site of a bar that serves linguists free drinks. Knowing that Ivan likes drinks, especially free ones, one assumes that if he believes he is heading to the site of Noam’s bar he will be cheered up. The remaining question is whether he believes, via his ‘Donostia’ notion, that the bus is headed there. If he is sincere, what he says about where the bus is heading, using the term ‘Donostia’ will indicate the presence or absence of such a belief. Given that these are the issues in the air, Tom’s report (4), tells the veterans what they need to know. The content of Ivan’s relevant belief, the one involving his ‘Donostia’ notion, is that the bus isn’t going there. So he’s not in the right mental state to be cheered up.

Suppose now that the context of Tom’s remark isn’t so clear to the veterans. That is, they are not sure at the outset what Tom is trying to communicate to them. A few minutes ago he reported (6), to reassure them the bus was headed to Donostia, on Ivan’s authority. Now he says (4). Is his point that Ivan has changed his mind? Or is it rather that Tom’s conversational goals are different? If the latter seems more plausible, one will fill in the missing contextual information in a way that makes sense. Before he
was reporting what Ivan said relative to a thread relevant to his actions of getting us on this bus rather than another. Now he is reporting what Ivan said relative to a thread that is relevant to why seeing the sign about Noam’s didn’t cheer him up.

Now consider Kaplan’s argument, in particular “the tricky case”. Paul and Charles have disguised themselves as each other and changed places. Kaplan is looking at Charles. But he thinks he is looking at Paul. He says, “He now lives in Princeton, New Jersey.” Kaplan argues that what he says in this case is false, and would have been false, even if the changing of places has not occurred, although in that case it would not have been what he said.

One can grant all of this, and still be dubious that in this circumstance the report, “Kaplan said that Charles lives in Princeton,” would be true. Our account explains what is going on here. There are two threads in Kaplan’s head, leading to Charles. One involves the notions that controls his use of ‘Charles’, the other involves his perceptual notion, which is of Charles since Charles is the person he is looking at, and controls the use of ‘he’. This latter thread is connected with his ‘Paul’ notion, and the beliefs associated with that notion have become temporarily (until the ruse is disclosed) associated with his perceptual notion.

Suppose the issue is where Charles lives, and Kaplan is deemed to be an expert about where his philosophical friends reside. In this context, it would not be true to say “Kaplan said that Charles lives in Princeton.” Of his two notions of Charles, the one that is authoritative about residence issues is the old one that controls his use of ‘Charles’, not the new one that controls his use of ‘he’. There is no utterance on a thread that goes through the authoritative ‘Charles’ notion, and has the content that Charles lives in Princeton. This explanation of why it would be untrue in certain contexts to say “Kaplan said that Charles lives in Princeton” does not argue against the view that it is referential content that is at issue. The problem with the report is that in these contexts the speaker is talking about tracks on which authoritative utterances lie, and there is no authoritative utterance by Kaplan with the content that Charles lives in Princeton.

5. The General Theory of Content

The classificatory conception of content suggests the possibility of generalizing our ordinary concept of content in a way useful for theoretical pur-
poses. Focusing on assertive utterances, one can think of contents as abstract objects that encode the truth-conditions of the utterances. But the truth-conditions of an utterance is a relative and incremental concept. That is, one is saying what else the world has to be like, for the utterance to be true, given certain facts about the utterance that are taken as fixed. The concept of the referential content of an utterance gets at what else the world has to be like for the utterance to be true, given the language of the utterance, the disambiguated meanings and syntax of the words and phrases, and the facts, including contextual facts, that determine the reference of the singular terms and other contextually sensitive items.

But one can naturally extend the concept of content, by considering the truth-conditions of an utterance with some some of these items left unfixed. For example, the referential content of an utterance $u$ of “I don’t live in Princeton,” spoken to Kaplan by Charles while disguised as Paul, is simply the proposition that Charles doesn’t live in Princeton. An utterance of “Charles doesn’t live in Princeton” would have had the same referential content. But if we abstract over the contextual fact that the speaker of the utterance is Charles, what else has to be the case for $u$ to be true? The speaker of $u$ has to not live in Princeton. This proposition, that the speaker of $u$ doesn’t live in Princeton, is a singular proposition about $u$ and Princeton. It seems that this is the crucial bit of information that Charles is attempting to convey to Kaplan. Kaplan realizes that the person he is looking at, the one he has been taking to be Paul, is the speaker of $u$. So he learns that the person he is looking at, and has recently demonstrated with ‘he’, does not live in Princeton. If he is confident that Paul has not moved, and he believes what he hears, we will have to conclude that the person he just demonstrated, the person he is talking to, is not Paul after all.

The proposition that the speaker of $u$ does not live in Princeton what we call ‘utterance-bound’ or ‘reflexive’ truth-conditions of the utterance $u$; that is, truth-conditions that are conditions on the utterance $u$ itself. These contents are not alternatives to the referential content, but supplement it and mesh with it. In the actual world, the proposition that the speaker of $u$ doesn’t live in Princeton, and the proposition that Charles doesn’t live in Princeton, will have the same truth-value.

In his argument, Kaplan distinguishes between two different questions we might ask concerning the counterfactual circumstance, in which Charles disguised as Paul is the person he points to. One concerns the proposition Pat, the proposition that Kaplan actually expressed --- that is, what he actually said, when he said “He lives in Princeton”. Kaplan thinks Pat is the
proposition that Paul lives in Princeton, and this proposition will still be true in the counterfactual circumstance.

The second question is whether Mike, what Kaplan would have said in the counterfactual circumstance, would have been true in that circumstance. What he would have said is that Charles lives in Princeton. That proposition is false, and would have been false, since we didn’t build anything about Charles living anywhere else into the counterfactual circumstance.

Earlier we distinguished Pat and Mike from Erin, the proposition *that the person to whom the speaker points lives in Princeton*. Erin is neither what Kaplan actually said, nor what he would have said. Nevertheless, we think that Erin deserves a place in the account of what happened; that is the theorist can find a role for Erin, even though it is not what is said in either the actual or the counterfactual circumstance.

Although Erin is not what Kaplan said in the counterfactual situation, he committed himself to the truth of it, for it is a truth-condition of his utterance; it is what the world has to be like for the utterance to be true given the meaning of the words used in English and of the gesture of pointing. Since Kaplan realized that he was the speaker, he also committed himself to the content we get by fixing this fact:

Megan: that the person who whom Kaplan points lives in Princeton.

When Charles said “I don’t live in Princeton,” his plan is roughly as follows:

Kaplan knows English, so he will know that my utterance is true iff the speaker of it does not live in Princeton. He can see that I am the speaker, and he realizes that I am the very person he pointed two a few seconds ago. So he will realize that if my utterance it true, the proposition that the person to whom he pointed lives in Princeton (i.e. Megan) is false, and so realize that what he said was false.

It is Megan that Charles intends to convince Kaplan of the falsity of, when he says “I don’t live in Princeton”. It wouldn’t have worked to say the same thing by saying “Charles doesn’t live in Princeton,” because the truth-conditions of that utterance don’t conflict with Megan.

### 6. Plans and Implicatures

Understanding implicatures is a matter of intention discovery. Using language to generate implicatures is an intentional activity. But in both gen-
eration and understanding, the intentions are complex; they involve not a single intention, but a structure of intentions, to do one thing by doing another.

In the case of Charles in disguise, by saying “I don’t live in Princeton,” he intended to say that he didn’t live in Princeton. By saying that, he intended for Kaplan to figure out that what he had just said was false, and that the person in front of him was not Paul. This was part of what Charles meant; that is, he intended for Kaplan to recognize his intention. That is to say, he implicated that Kaplan had said something false, and that it wasn’t Paul that he demonstrated. In order for Charles to succeed in this, it didn’t suffice to simply say that he didn’t live in Princeton; he had to say it in a certain way. He had to say in such a way that the truth-conditions of his utterance were inconsistent with what Kaplan had said, given facts that he could count on Kaplan knowing, in particular that the speaker was the same person Kaplan had just referred to.

Charles plans for Kaplan’s reasoning to begin with Kaplan hearing his utterance, and grasping its utterance-bound content, that the speaker of $u$ doesn’t live in Princeton. Then he relies on Kaplan grasping its content given that the speaker is the person he sees in front of him, that that person doesn’t live in Princeton. Then, since he will recognize the person he sees in front of him is the same person he just referred to, he will grasp that the person he sees in front of him does not live in Princeton, and that what he said was false. And given his firm belief that Paul lives in Princeton, he will grasp that he wasn’t demonstrating Paul.

Charles plans on Kaplan’s reasoning beginning with the utterance-bound content, not with what he says. Thus we distinguish between what Charles says, or what is said by his utterance $u$, and the operative propositions. These are the propositions that he counts on Kaplan grasping in order to grasp his implicatures.

This example is typical of implicatures; the operative propositions are typically not what is said, but propositions that correspond to various truth-conditions that abstract from some of the fact relevant to determining what is said.

Suppose that, having lunch around a table at Tresidder Union at Stanford, David, John and Dikran are talking about boring university towns. Dikran says, “Princeton is even more boring than Palo Alto. I can’t imagine living in such a place.” John whispers:

(7) He lives in Princeton,
moving his eyes towards a man sitting at a couple of tables from theirs. He implicates that they should lower their voices if they didn’t want to offend a Princetonian. Now, what’s the operative content of John’s utterance?

As a matter of fact, Dikran and David cannot see Paul, but John doesn’t intend them to turn and look at Paul ---causing an embarrassing situation, as Paul would think they were talking about him. In this case, the referential content of John’s utterance, *that Paul lives in Princeton,* ---our old friend Pat--- is not what John intends to communicate to David and Dikran. For all we know, Pat can be a proposition that they both knew before John uttered anything. But John’s point was not to remind them about that. In fact, as he didn’t want them to turn around rudely to look at Paul, he couldn’t reasonably intend them to grasp what he said, in any way that would allow them to recognize it as something they already knew. He is not trying to convince them that the actual world is one in which Paul lives in Princeton. He is trying to convince them that the actual world is one in which a Princetonian sits within earshot of them. It is by convincing them of this, that he hopes to instill in them the belief that it would be a good idea to lower their voices while saying negative things about Princeton.

John’s plans more or less as follows.

David and Dikran will hear my utterance (7). They understand English and realize that it is true iff the person I am referring to with ‘he’ lives in Princeton. They will see me pointing, and although they cannot see to whom I am pointing, they will realize I am pointing to someone nearby, and he is the person to whom I’m referring. Thus they will realize that someone near them is from Princeton. Given a modicum of common sense and politeness, they will realize we should not continue our conversation about the dullness of Princeton, or at least not at such a level so that a person nearby can hear. They will also notice that I am whispering, and figure out that I am doing that so the person I am referring to won’t hear me, and will follow my example.

The operative proposition here, the key to Dikran and David grasping John’s implicature, is the proposition that someone nearby is from Princeton. This is the linch-pin of the inferences he expect them to make, in figuring out what he is trying to convey to them and trying to get them to do. This is not what John said. Nor is it merely the utterance-bound content of his utterance. It is a proposition that encodes the truth-conditions of his utterance given a combination of semantical and contextual properties.

What about the proposition he expressed, what he says, that Paul is from Princeton? There is a sense in which David and Dikran will grasp this;
they will have various utterance bound and context-bound conceptions of this proposition:

That the person referred to by the speaker of (7) is from Princeton;

That the person John refers to is from Princeton

That the person behind us and referred to by John is from Princeton.

But John does not plan on them being able to identify this proposition in any way that connects with their pre-existing notions of Paul; in that sense, his plan does not depend on them recognizing what he says.

So here again, the operative propositions are not the propositions that referentialism identifies with what is said. And yet, the referentialist account of what is said permits us to identify the propositions that are operative.

7. Conclusion

We agree with referentialism that what is said by simple utterances involving indexical, demonstratives and names are singular propositions with the referents of those terms as constituents, in spite of the problems posed for this view by problems of cognitive significance. More is involved in reporting what a person says, and answering the question, “What did he say?” than simply identifying these singular propositions. The questions, to which saying reports provide answers, can be, and typically are, questions about what a person said, in the course of a certain conversation, with utterances that drew on certain notions and beliefs involving those notions, that are relevant to certain actions the sayer might or might not take, or certain sources of information, the sayer might or might not have. Given an appreciation of the complexity and subtlety of such question and the reports that answer them, we can see how saying what a person said can provide information about utterances that goes beyond the bare identity of the singular propositions.
Grice is right that implicatures are generated by what a person says, if one interprets this to mean that the information needed to figure out the implicatures is the sort of information conveyed by answering questions about what is said. But, in line with what was said in the last paragraph, these answers will not simply identify the singular propositions expressed by the sayer. They will identify that proposition as the proposition expressed in the course of a conversation, with various various contextual facts fixed in various ways. A person says something --- expresses a singular proposition --- by constructing an utterance that has certain truth-conditions. What is said will correspond to the referential content of the utterance, what the world has to be like for the utterance to be true, given facts about meaning and reference. But other truth-conditions of the utterance can be identified by abstracting from some reference-fixing facts, and fixing other contextual facts. The operative propositions, those the grasping of which will lead to grasping the implicatures, can be, and typically are, among these other truth-conditions of the utterance.

Thus, while the insights of Grice and those of the referentialists do not fit together in as simple a way as we conceived at the outset, with the "output" of semantics constituting the "input" to pragmatics, within a general theory of content the consistency of the insights can be appreciated. Referential semantics does provide what Gricean pragmatic needs.

8. References

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forthcoming
Error! Style not defined.