Three Demonstrations and A Funeral

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Abstract: Gricean pragmatics seems to pose a dilemma. If semantics is limited to the conventional meanings of types of expressions, then the semantics of an utterance does not determine what is said. If all that figures in the determination of what is said counts as semantics, then pragmatic reasoning about the specific intentions of a speaker intrudes on semantics. The dilemma is false. Key points: Semantics need not determine what is said, and the description, with which the hearer begins, need not provide the hearer with knowledge of what was said, or the ability to express what was said, from the hearer's context.

§1. A Dilemma about What is Said

Consider Grice’s classic example of the motorist who has run out of petrol—long considered a paradigm of Gricean implicature:
Example Ia

A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by B. The following exchange takes place:

A: I am out of petrol

B: There is a garage around the corner. (Grice, 1967a/1989, p. 32)\(^1\)

According to Grice, B says that there is a garage around the corner, and implicates that it is or at least may be open and selling petrol. The implicature is an instance of Gricean meaning; that is, B intends to get A to believe that the garage may be open, and to do so as a result of believing that B intends him to believe this. We see the contrast between what is said and what is implicated as a central part of Grice's theory. Essential to this central part is an account of the reasoning involved; how the speaker plans and the hearer interprets the speaker's intentional act of uttering.

Grice's provides this formula for understanding such implicatures:

'He has said that \(p\); there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP; he could not be doing this unless he thought that \(q\); he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that \(q\) is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that \(q\); he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that \(q\); and so he has implicated that \(q\).' (Grice, 1967a/1989, p. 31).

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\(^1\) All page references to Grice's work are from Grice, 1989.
It seems then that to understand implicatures, one first must grasp what is said. Then one finds the implicatures, by asking what further communicative intentions a helpful conversational partner would have for saying *that*.

This picture seems to fit well with a certain view about the 'semantics-pragmatics interface.' It is the job of semantics to determine what is said. Then pragmatics takes over, and tells us what is further implicated.

The picture also seems to fit well with a view of semantics as computing truth-conditions of utterances compositionally according to the types of expressions used in the utterances and the ways they are combined. This part of planning and interpreting utterances does not involve the open-ended, pragmatic processes typically involved in figuring out how to have a certain effect in a particular situation, or figuring out what someone intended to do. Beyond the intention to speak a certain language, it all depends on rules connected with types by that language, not on the facts of a particular utterance.

Unfortunately, this picture doesn’t seem to fit well with the combination of both views. Semantics, conceived as computing in this way, does not get us all the way to what is said. The rules associated by English with the sentence 'I am out of petrol,' get us to a truth-condition for utterances of it: such an utterance will be true if its speaker is out of petrol at the time of the utterance. But this is not what is said. *A* hasn’t said anything about his utterance. The proposition that he expresses, what he says, is that *he* is out of petrol at *t*, where *t* is the time of the utterance. What he said could be true, after all, even if he didn’t bother to say it. To get from the output of semantics so conceived, to what is said, we need two facts about this particular utterance, who said it, and when.
As Grice said, concerning an utterance of 'He was in the grip of a vice,'

'Given a knowledge of the English language, but no knowledge of the circumstances of the utterance, one would know something about what the speaker had said, on the assumption that he was speaking standard English, and speaking literally. One would know that he had said, about some particular male person or animal $x$, that at the time of utterance (whatever that was), either (1) $x$ was unable to rid himself of a certain kind of bad character trait or (2) some part of $x$'s person was caught in a certain kind of tool or instrument (approximate account, of course).’ Grice 1967/1989, p. 25

The additional knowledge needed largely concerns the speaker's intentions: to whom did the speaker refer with 'he,' and what meaning did the speaker intend to convey with 'vice'. It seems that semantics, conceived narrowly as what we know when we know the rules of a language, gets us only part way to what is said, the input of pragmatics.

We seem to have here a fundamental dilemma for the Gricean picture, which has shaped discussion of 'the semantics-pragmatics interface' from the 1960's until the present. Do we stick to the narrow conception of semantics? Then pragmatics has to take over before we get to what is said. Or do we stick to the conception of semantics as giving us what is said? Then we must abandon the conception of semantics as computing according to rules of language associated with types.

Still, things don't seem so bad. It's pretty automatic to see who the speaker is and what time it is. Particularly if one is the speaker. Whenever I say
something, I am the speaker, and the time is, as I would put it then, now.
Perhaps an ever so slightly augmented conception of semantics as computing according to rules, that allows for the virtually mechanical application of the rules for 'I' and 'now' to the particular facts of an utterance, can be accepted.

Grice’s own thinking was along these lines, but went further. He regarded what is said as determined by the conventional rules, plus the facts about which meanings of ambiguous terms and phrases were in play, plus the facts that determined the referents of indexicals and demonstratives, plus, perhaps, known facts about the designations of definite descriptions. There is no way that these facts can be gathered under the narrow conception of semantics. If we consider semantics the science that tells us what is said, Grice let the nose of the pragmatic camel intrude under the tent of semantics.

Subsequently, a number of pragmatists have argued that the factors listed won’t always get us to what is said, at least in one fairly robust sense of that phrase. We need to deal with hidden indexicals, unarticulated constituents, and enrichments of various kinds. In the light of this, debate has focused on how much more of the camel needs to be let in. In Recanati’s terminology (Recanati, 2004), those on the literalist side don’t want to go beyond Grice, even as it has become clear that the factors listed above won’t get us to what is said. Those on

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2 Grice prefers to remain agnostic on this point:

‘This brief indication of my use of say leaves it open whether a man who says (today) Harold Wilson is a great man and another who says (also today) The British Prime Minister is a great man would, if each knew that the two singular terms had the same reference, have said the same thing.’ Grice 1967/1989, p. 25.
the *contextualist* side want to let as much of the camel in as is required, and some suspect that the camel of pragmatics will pretty much take up the tent, leaving precious little for semantics, conceived as the computation of meaning according to rules, to do.

We argue the dilemma is false. We don’t let any of the camel under the tent. We advocate sticking to the narrow conception of semantics, and accepting that what it delivers, as Grice pointed out in the quotation above, does not determine what the speaker says, nor enable the hearer to identify fully it. Still, we claim, the output of semantics is all that is needed as the input into pragmatics.

The key to our view is a distinction between *description* of what is said, and *determination* and knowledge of what is said. Gricean pragmatics requires a description of what is said, and this semantics narrowly conceived can provide, with no intrusion from pragmatics. Semantics can provide a description of what is said by an utterance, even though semantics, by itself, does not fully determine, but only constrains, what is said. Possession of the description of what is said provided by semantics will often not count as *knowing* what is said, and may not even enable one to *express* what is said. Nevertheless, we argue, it is adequate for the needs of pragmatics. In section §§ 2-7 we use Grice’s example to explain why we think that semantics, narrowly conceived, supplies what is needed for the pragmatic reasoning, and explain some terminology and ideas. In §§8—10 we look at examples of our own construction, concerning demonstratives (‘Three Demonstrations’), domains of quantification (of people at ‘A Funeral’), and names, to illustrate how descriptions of what is said provided
by semantics interact with pragmatic reasoning about speaker intentions to secure the understanding of what is said and what is implicated. In the last section we return to the nature of the saying/implicating distinction.

§2. Gricean Reasoning

Grice is interested in the implicature of B’s remark, that the garage around the corner is probably open, or at least has someone around that can be roused, and might have petrol. But let’s think for a minute about B’s interpretation of A’s opening remark. A’s opening remark sets the stage for B’s reply, since B is trying to be helpful to A. It is natural to take A’s opening remark as implicating that he would like some help in finding petrol for his car.

Let’s suppose that in fact A is Harold Wilson. According to the theories of names and indexicals that are now widely accepted, A would have then expressed the same proposition in this scenario, the singular proposition individuated by Harold Wilson and the property of being out of petrol.

Example Ib

A: Harold Wilson is out of petrol.

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3 We pick Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister from 1964 to 1970 and from 1974 to 1976, because Grice talks about 'Harold Wilson' and 'the Prime Minister' (see previous note).

4 Grice himself was sympathetic to this in the case of demonstratives. To understand what is said by an utterance containing a demonstrative referring to x, he thought necessary to know the identity of x (Grice 1967/1989, p. 25).
B: There is a garage around the corner

In scenario Ib there is no motivation for B’s remark. What does the proximity of a garage to the participants in the conversation have to do with Harold Wilson’s being out of petrol?

Let’s look again at Grice’s formula for understanding such implicatures:

’He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.’

(Grice, 1967a/1989, p. 31)

So in Ia B thinks:

This fellow I am talking to says that he is out of petrol…he would not be doing this unless he thought that I could help him…

Here the phrase ‘that he is out of petrol,’ designates the proposition that A expressed with ‘I am out of petrol.’ The that-clause is, as we shall say, a propositional description. As Grice realized, it is not just the proposition described (that P) that is important, but the way it is described (that P). It is this particular description, not the proposition that it describes, that is crucial to A’s reasoning. Here are some other descriptions of the same proposition:

What that man just said

That Harold Wilson is out of petrol
Although each of these describes the same proposition as 'that \textit{he} is out of petrol,' they would not play an equivalent role in the hearer's reasoning about what is implicated. This raises the question, then, of which descriptions of what is said are appropriate to reasoning about implicatures, and how one arrives at them, on the basis of the expressions one hears the speaker use.

§3. \textbf{Interpreting Utterances and Other Actions}

Grice considers both saying and implicating as special cases of meaning. The speaker seeks to induce or reinforce beliefs in the hearer by getting the hearer to recognize that very intention. The hearer's job, then, is to interpret action, in the sense of figuring out the intentions with which it is done.

Descriptions like 'what that man said' do not contain a sentence that the hearer could use to \textit{express} what is said, in contrast to descriptions like 'that Harold Wilson is out of petrol,' or 'that he is out of petrol' that do contain such sentences. We'll call these \textit{expressive descriptions of what is said}. In Grice's schema, the hearer's reasoning takes off from a thought of the form 'A said that S.' 'A' will be how the hearer thinks of the speaker; in the petrol case, something like 'this fellow I'm talking to,' or 'the fellow standing before me.' 'S', it seems, will be a sentence that, from the hearer's perspective, expresses the very same proposition that the speaker expressed with the sentence he used. In the petrol case, this will be something like, 'He is out of petrol,' which, in the context, expresses the same proposition \textit{A} expressed with 'I am out of petrol.' Grice's formulation implies or
at least strongly suggests that the hearer’s reasoning begins with an *expressive description* of what is said.\(^5\)

We want to note that in the general case of interpreting action, arriving at something analogous to an expressive description seldom plays any role. Suppose that you are watching Beckham executing a corner kick. What you see is someone approaching a ball and moving his body, legs, and right foot in a certain way, and the ball leaving the ground, and so forth. You interpret what you see as action, and will usually not find it too hard to figure out the intention behind it, what Beckham is trying to do. Most clearly, he is trying to put the ball in the goal or in a position where a teammate can put it in the goal. Perhaps you can confidently go further: he was trying to get it in front of the goal, about six feet high, so that Ronaldo could head it in.

One thing you will probably not do, in interpreting Beckham's corner kick, is to try to figure out how you could have moved your body and your legs and so forth, so as to do the same thing, achieve the same result, from where you are sitting, that Beckham achieves, or tries to achieve, from the corner. To do so would be rather silly. Among other things, even if you could kick the ball from the stands to the perfect place for Beckham’s teammate to head it into the goal, something that would be even harder than what Beckham is trying to do, it would not count as a goal, since the rules of soccer do not permit fans to assist in scoring goals.

\(^5\) We think this applies to Grice’s picture either understood as a processing model or as a rational reconstruction.
It is a feature of language and communication that something like an expressive hearer’s representation often seems possible. Language is such a powerful instrument that we assume that at least in a very wide set of circumstances, if there is a way for A to say that P in his circumstances, then there must be a way for B to say that P in his circumstances. B may well take advantage of this way of saying what A said to report what A said, should he be called on to do so. Nevertheless, we don’t think such representations are essential to pragmatic reasoning.

Let’s call descriptions like ‘what he said,’ non-sentential descriptions of what is said. There is an important class of category between non-sentential and expressive descriptions, which we’ll call utterance-bound descriptions of what is said. These descriptions are sentential, but the words used in the sentences identify some of the factors in what is said only indirectly, in terms of the utterance itself, or, more usually, some elements of the utterance, such as the speaker. Some examples:

He said that whomever he was talking about was a fool.

Whoever wrote this said that he or she was very depressed at the time they wrote it.

She said that Mabel invited everyone in whatever group they were talking about to the party.

Jim said that it was raining somewhere or other—wherever he was talking about.
Fred said, of whomever he was using the name 'John' to refer to, that he talked too much in department meetings—but there are three Johns in the department, so I don't know exactly what he said.

These descriptions, unlike 'what is said,' employ sentences that provide some information about the content of what was said. But they do not express what was said. They can be used when the person doing the describing does not know what was said. In each case, the ignorance resulted from lack of knowledge of the speaker's or writer's situation. The intentions of the speaker are a key item of ignorance.

Our key claim in this paper is that semantics, conceived as a science of the meanings of types of expressions, can provide utterance-bound descriptions of what is said, that provide the input for pragmatic processing. Semantics has the job of allowing the hearer to describe what is said, but it does not have the job of providing an expressive description of what was said, as opposed to an utterance-bound description.

§4.  Saying and Describing What is Said

Following Grice, we regard saying as an activity that paradigmatically involves a speaker's intention to get the hearer to believe that the world meets certain conditions, by recognizing the speaker's intention to do so. Philosophers keep track of these conditions with abstract objects for which they use the term 'proposition'—a term that is used in related, but somewhat different ways, by
some other pragmatists. Propositions are canonically described with the phrase 'that S', where S is a declarative sentence.

If I say, 'Elizabeth enjoys raising dogs,' I have said that Elizabeth enjoys raising dogs. If, however, I say, 'Perhaps Elizabeth enjoys raising dogs,' or 'If Elizabeth enjoys raising dogs, it is because they are better behaved than most of her children,' I haven't actually said that Elizabeth enjoys raising dogs. I have, in the terminology we will use, expressed the proposition that Elizabeth enjoys raising dogs. My intention is not to get my hearer to believe, but to consider, the proposition that Elizabeth enjoys raising dogs, by recognizing my intention to have him do so.

The resources a speaker has to say something, or more generally to express a proposition, include, but are not limited to, the conventions of language. The speaker may rely on generally known facts, customs, and default expectations—what Searle calls 'the background' (Searle, 1980). He may rely on particular facts about the linguistic and non-linguistic context, and shared beliefs, about it. Uttering words with the intention of expressing a certain proposition $P$ is neither necessary nor sufficient for doing so. For example, if I intend to say that Jesus Mari knows Latin, and I say, 'Jesus Christ knows Latin,' I will not have said that Jesus Mari knows Latin, even if my hearers all rightly interpret my intention, and I will have said that Jesus Christ knows Latin, even though no one thinks I intended to do so.

There is an old tradition that holds that a speaker must know what proposition he expresses in order to say it, and that a hearer must know what proposition the speaker has said, in order to understand what is said. This old
tradition, which is an important part of the background for the view we reject, is neither very clear, nor obviously correct. Suppose, KK comes up behind JP and puts his hands over JP’s eyes and says, ‘I have a surprise.’ JP has no idea who is doing this. He says, ‘You have just broken my glasses.’ It seems that JP understands what has been said, even though he does not know that KK is the referent of ‘I’. And it seems that he has said that KK has broken his glasses, even though he does not know that KK is the referent of his use of ‘you’.

To maintain the principle, in the light of examples like this, one must adopt a relatively weak condition of knowing what proposition is expressed by an utterance. JP knows, in this case, that ‘I’ refers to the speaker of the utterance. Thus he can identify what is said by KK as, ‘that the speaker of this utterance has a surprise for me.’ Of course KK has not said anything about his own utterance. JP’s description is correct if we take it as meaning that there is a certain person who uttered the remark, and that what that person said, the proposition he expressed, is that he has a surprise. Does this count as knowing what is said? Of course, JP could go further, given that he realizes that the speaker is the person with his hands over his eyes: ‘the person with his hands over my eyes has said that he has a surprise for me, and I said that he has broken my glasses.’

Now suppose JP finds a note, in fact written by Mark Twain, in an old book he finds at his cabin. The note says, ‘I am sick of all these frog stories people are sending me.’ He has no idea who wrote the note or when. He can say, ‘The author of this note was sick of all the frog stories people were sending him around the time he wrote this note. And I’m sure he was right. He was sick of getting frog stories. Who wouldn’t be?’ Does JP know what proposition the
author of the note expressed? Or what proposition he expressed, when he registered his faith in the note-writer’s sincerity? Only if one adopts a weak condition for knowing what proposition was expressed.

We do not intend to develop an account of one's knowledge about which proposition is expressed by an utterance, either one's own or someone else's. But we do want to emphasize the point that understanding what one says, or what someone else says, in a way that enables one to formulate responses, come to opinions about the truth of the utterance, and seek to know more about it, does not, in general, require very much. The Mark Twain example shows that, for certain purposes, a merely utterance-bound or reflexive conception of the proposition expressed by an utterance suffices. By 'reflexive,' we mean a way of identifying the truth-conditions of an utterance in terms of the utterance itself, and the meaning of the expressions it uses, without recourse to more facts about it.

In thinking about these matters, it is important to distinguish facts about reference and truth-conditions, from psychological facts about speakers and hearers. When JP says to KK, 'you broke my glasses,' he refers to KK, and says something that is true iff KK has broken his glasses. KK is the referent of JP's use of the indexical 'you'. It is quite a separate issue whether JP has in his own mind linked the condition for being the referent of his use of 'you' with any notion he has of KK or anyone else. Even if JP is quite sure, for example, that FR is the culprit, he has not said that FR broke his glasses, but that KK did.

There are, then, a number of ways that a hearer might have for describing what a speaker has said. One important dimension along which these
descriptions vary is degree of reflexivity, of dependence on the utterance itself. When JP finds Twain's note, he can identify what it says only reflexively, in terms of the author of that very note. Being able to describe what the note said, in this reflexive way, may enable him to find out more about the author, and arrive at less utterance-bound ways of describing what is said.

First JP has the note dated by a scientist, and examines carefully the niche in the cabin in which it was found. He becomes certain that the note was written in 1878, stuck in the niche, and never removed, and so must have been written by someone residing in the cabin in 1878. He can now provide a less utterance-bound, but still not expressive, description of what the note says:

In this note, one of the residents of this cabin in 1878 says that he or she is sick of all the frog stories they are being sent.

After more research, leading to a study of Mark Twain’s time in Calaveras County and his feelings about frogs, JP can report

In this note, Mark Twain said that he was sick of all the frog stories he was being sent in 1878.

This description of the proposition Twain expressed is not utterance-bound at all; neither the author nor the year are identified in terms of the note. At this point JP might say confidently that he knows what the note said or what the author of the note said.

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6 Actually we believe it is important to distinguish between the note and the utterance, which was Twain’s intentional act in authoring the note (see Perry 2001, pp. 37-39), but we ignore this for the purposes of this essay.
One might think that the less utterance-bound a hearer’s description of what a speaker has said is, the better it will be for determining the implicatures the speaker intends to convey. This is not so, as we shall see when we return to Ia. But first we will develop a somewhat systematic way of approaching descriptions of what is said.

§5. Reflexive Truth-Conditions

In Perry, 2001 a distinction is made between referential and reflexive truth-conditions of an utterance. The idea is very simple; one looks at the truth-conditions of an utterance without fixing various contextual values, merely constraining them in terms of the utterance and whatever circumstances are taken as given. This generates a variety of truth-conditions, to all of which a competent language user may have access in various situations, and which can be used, we shall claim, in explaining the ‘cognitive significance’ of utterances, including their ability to trigger Gricean inferences.

The basic idea is that one can identify the truth-conditions of an utterance more or less reflexively, depending on how much knows about the utterance. This is captured by the schema:

Given …., what the speaker of $u$ said is true iff ---------

We use bold face roman to indicate which things are the subject matter of the proposition, the things it is about. For example,

that Schwarzenegger governs California
and

that Schwarzenegger governs the most populous state in the U.S.

designate the same proposition, the one which in a possible worlds framework would be modeled with the set of worlds in which Schwarzenegger governs California, including worlds in which California is not the most populous. On the other hand

that Schwarzenegger governs the most populous state in the U.S

is about Schwarzenegger and the U.S., saying he governs whichever state is most populous. The set of worlds that model this proposition would include some in which Schwarzenegger governs California, some in which he governs Nebraska, and so on.

Where \( u \) is a slightly simplified version of Mark Twain’s note, and using 'be' as a way of speaking tenselessly:

(i) Given that \( u \) is in English, and uses the sentence 'I am sick of frogs,' what the speaker of \( u \) says is true iff

(A) the speaker of \( u \) be sick of frogs at the time \( u \) be written.

(ii) Given all of that, plus that fact that Mark Twain wrote \( u \), what the speaker of \( u \) says is true iff

(B) Mark Twain be sick of frogs at the time \( u \) be written.

(iii) Given all of that, plus the fact that \( u \) be written in 1878, what the speaker of \( u \) says is true iff

(C) Mark Twain be sick of frogs in 1878.
(A) is about ū, (B) is about ū and Mark Twain, and (C) is about Mark Twain and 1878, and not about ū at all.

Thus, the conception that a hearer has available of what a speaker of an utterance has said depends on how much the hearer knows about the utterance. The reflexive truth-conditions, as we have in (A) and (B), are not the same as what is said. Mark Twain did not say anything about his own note. (A) and (B) are utterance-bound ways of getting at the truth conditions of the note. When we get to (C), however, the truth-conditions correspond to the proposition expressed. They are no longer conditions on the utterance, as in (A) and (B), but on the subject matter, the things out in the world that Twain was talking about, which exist independently of the utterance.\footnote{One may well doubt that Twain said something about 1878, by using the present tense when he wrote in 1878, but we will oversimplify these issues for the purpose of this essay.}

With this under our belts, we return to Ia.

§6. Back to Ia

Here is our reconstruction of B’s reasoning:

1. 'The utterance I am hearing, ū, is an utterance by someone of 'I am out of petrol.' [This B knows through hearing ū and recognizing its basic phonological properties.]
2. 'Given that \( u \) is in English, it is true iff the speaker of \( u \) is out of petrol at the time of \( u \).’ [B recognizes the language as English, and he knows the meaning of the sentence.]

3. 'Given all of that, and that the speaker is the person I am now looking at, it expresses the proposition that the person I am looking at is out of petrol now.’ [B turns and sees that the speaker is someone in his shop (as opposed, say, to someone on the radio) and therefore that the time of the utterance is the present.]

4. 'Given that, and the fact that the person I am talking to is Harold Wilson, and it is now noon June 18, 1962, it expresses the proposition that Harold Wilson is out of petrol at noon June 18, 1962.’ [B recognizes that the person talking to him is the Prime Minister, and looks at the clock and the calendar.]

Thoughts 1 and 2 do not contain enough information to motivate B's helpful reply. Neither does step 4. It is thought 3 that puts B in a position to recognize the implicature, that A would like to know where he can get some petrol.

To recognize the implicature, B needs to ask under what conditions it is, as we shall say, 'Conversationally appropriate'. (We use this phrase as a way of not taking a position, in this essay, about whether Grice’s theory of conversational maxims, or some improved version of them, or some relatively radical departure from them, such as proposed by relevance theorists, is the best account of the constraints involved.) So instead of the schema,

\[ Given \ldots, u \text{ is true iff } \ldots \]
Given ..., u is Conversationally-appropriate only if ----

Notice that being conversationally appropriate is, unlike truth, a relational concept. The remark is to be relevant to a particular conversation, in this case the one A is initiating with B. It is conceivable that a single statement could be part of two conversations, with different implicatures for each. Imagine Harold Wilson saying 'I'm out of petrol,' on the phone to a reporter who has asked him about running for election, while simultaneously glancing meaningfully towards the petrol can in a way his subordinate cannot mistake.

If we simply take what is said as given, we won't get any significant results. Let \( P \) be the proposition that Harold Wilson be out of petrol at noon June 18, 1962. This proposition could be expressed by indefinitely many sentences in various situations. From the fact that an utterance expresses this proposition, that this is what the speaker says, nothing follows about what the speaker implicates; that is, from just knowing this about the utterance, one cannot reasonably draw any conclusions about what else the speaker might be intending the hearer's of his remark to come to believe by recognition of his intentions.

In the petrol case, A means to convey that he would like B to provide some information about where he can get petrol. What is given will be such facts as that the speaker of u is talking to B, that he is a stranger, initiating a conversation, that he doesn't seem to be telling a joke or recounting a story, and so forth. Also what is given will be what A said. The key point is that the
description of what is said will have to interact with the other factors, if any implicature is to be generated. B’s thinking will be something like this:

Given that u is in English, etc., and that the speaker of u this fellow, and this fellow isn't telling a joke or a long story about his miserable life, and that u is true iff he is out of petrol now, u makes conversational sense only if this fellow would like me to provide some information about where he can get petrol now.

If we substitute the description of what A said from 4), we get something that makes no sense:

Given that u is in English, etc., and that the speaker of u this fellow, and this fellow isn't telling a joke or a long story about his miserable life, and that u is true iff Harold Wilson is out of petrol at noon June 18, 1962, u makes conversational sense only if this fellow would like me to provide some information about where he can get petrol now.

This way of looking at things leads to the following conclusion: In order to figure out the implicatures of a remark, the hearer needs to arrive at a description of what is said that allows him to figure out what else the speaker must intend to convey, for the speaker to suppose that the remark is conversationally appropriate.

This means that Grice's schema requires too little of the hearer. B's reasoning could not have gotten off the ground if he merely had the description 'the speaker of u said that Harold Wilson be out of petrol at noon June 18, 1962.'
However, Grice’s schema also requires too much, as we shall see in the next section.

§7. Grice’s example

Now we look at B’s reply to A

B: There is a garage around the corner.

In arriving at an understanding of what B means, A will have to arrive at an understanding of what B said that interacts with other facts about the conversation:

Given that the utterance is in English etc., that this man directed it at me, it is true iff there is a garage around some corner salient to the two of us.

Given all of that, and that he knows I am out of petrol and am seeking information about where I can get some, the remark is conversationally appropriate only if he believes that the garage probably sells petrol and probably is open, or at least there is someone there who can be roused to sell the petrol.

Suppose that B, being English, muttered his remark in such a way that it sounded to A like,

There is a garage mumble.

A would still be able to describe what B said, although he would not be able to say it in his own words:
Given that the utterance in English etc., that this man directed it at me, etc. it is true iff there is a garage at some place to which the words I heard as 'mumble' refer.

This understanding of B’s remark, through an utterance-bounded description, should suffice for A to figure out the implicature, that B believes the garage in question probably sells petrol, etc. He can then ask for more details about where the garage is.

We see, then, that Grice’s schema requires both too much as well as too little. It requires too much in that to figure out the implicature, the hearer need not have a sentence 'S' with which he can think:

\[ B \text{ said that } S. \]

He merely needs to have a description

\[ \text{Given ..., B’s utterance is true iff so-and-so} \]

such that the information in '...' and the conditions in 'so-and-so' interact so as to have implications about the conditions under which the utterance is conversationally appropriate.

§8. Three Demonstrations

Aside, perhaps, from the first-person pronoun, resolution of the reference of indexicals and demonstratives requires knowledge of speaker intentions.\(^8\)

\(^8\) See Perry, 2001, §4.4 for discussion.
Knowledge of these intentions is not some sort of special process of intention
discovery that belongs on the semantics side of the semantics-pragmatics divide.
It is a part of the general job of pragmatics, which is to work out what is said and
what is implicated, based on the constraints on what is said delivered by
semantics, by working out the speakers' intentions.

This point is shown by the fact that the appropriate description of what is
said, for the purpose of deriving implicatures, is not simply a matter of
semantics. The 'resolution of indexicals and demonstratives' is simply part of the
process of figuring out what the speaker is trying to do.

Return to the Grice example. How did B know that he should think of
what A said in terms of 'this fellow is out of petrol,' rather than 'Harold Wilson is
out of petrol?' Clearly because this description of what A said meshed with other
facts to identify an implicature that made conversational sense of the
conversation. We illustrate this further with three examples that involve
interpreting demonstratives.

Suppose JP says to KK, while KK is driving along the narrow and
picturesque streets of Donostia,

(8) He is going to drive his car into yours.

JP is, let us imagine, referring to FR, a famous philosopher, who is careening
down the street in the opposite direction. There is a pretty clear implicature that
KK would do well to engage in evasive maneuvers, to avoid getting hit. But how
is KK supposed to figure this out?
If we analyze the case in terms of reflexive truth-conditions, it seems that we can construct a reasonable account. The reflexive truth-conditions of JP’s utterance are derived by instantiation from:

\[(9) \quad \text{An utterance } u \text{ of (8) is true iff } \exists x,y \text{ the speaker of } u \text{ refers to } x \text{ with 'he' and addresses } y \text{ with 'you' and } x \text{ is going to drive } x'\text{'}s \text{ car into } y'\text{'s car.}\]

Let’s call JP’s utterance of (8), ‘\(u\).’ Then we have by instantiation,

\[(10) \quad u \text{ is true iff } \exists x,y \text{ the speaker of } u \text{ refers to } x \text{ with 'he' and } y \text{ with 'you' and } x \text{ is going to drive } x'\text{'s \text{ car into } y'\text{'s car.}\]

In this case there are a number of 'modes of presentation' that KK has of FR:

i) The person to whom the speaker of \(u\) is referring with the use of 'he.' This is based on hearing the utterance and knowing English.

ii) The person to whom my passenger is referring with the use of 'he'. This is based on the above, plus KK’s perception that his passenger is the speaker of \(u\).

iii) The person the passenger of my car is staring at, bug-eyed, as he screams at me. This is based on the above, plus common-sense, plus further observation of the passenger.

iv) The person driving that car that is now to my right but is cutting across the street so it will soon be on my left. This is based on the above, plus observing the scene to which the passenger was directing his gaze.

v) The famous philosopher FR. This is based on the above, plus recognizing the driver of the car as the famous philosopher, FR.
It’s clear in this case that the speaker intends for the hearer to think of the referent of ‘he’ as in iv). Until the hearer gets to mode of presentation iv), he is not in a position to do much about the fact that FR is careening towards him. To take proper evasive action, it is unnecessary, and perhaps counterproductive, to recognize JP’s referent as the famous philosopher FR. KK might become awestruck to be on the same street at FR and freeze. Similarly, the speaker intends the hearer to think of himself as the referent of ‘you.’

We note that it is natural to appeal to considerations of conversational relevance to explain the special status of mode of presentation iv). The speaker has every reason to believe that the hearer will put in the cognitive effort to arrive at this description of what is said, as until he gets to this point, he has no way of acting on the information he has been given. The speaker expects that the hearer’s efforts to resolve the demonstrative ‘he’ will be guided by the principle of conversational relevance, however. When the resolution fits in with other factors so as to generate a clear implicature—that is at level iv)—the efforts at resolution should cease and efforts at evasion should begin.

Now let us alter the example slightly. KK is organizing a talk later in the afternoon, where RC is to be the featured speaker. However, RC has not yet arrived in Donostia as far as KK knows and KK is a little worried about whether she will show. RC is driving down the street, but it is a somewhat wider street, and she is driving carefully and soberly. JP recognizes RC and says,

(11) She is driving toward the Aula Magna now.

In this case, in order to arrive at a relevant representation of the proposition expressed, KK needs to go further:
i) The person to whom the speaker of u is referring with the use of 'she'

ii) The person to whom my passenger is referring with the use of 'she'

iii) The person at whom the passenger of my car is looking.

iv) The person driving the car that is approaching on my left.

v) The famous pragmatist RC.

KK must get all the way to v) before he comes to a representation of the what is said that is reasonably relevant, given that it implicates:

RC will be on time.

Finally suppose that KK and JP are driving along a wide boulevard with no traffic problems. KK has asked JP for suggestions about whom to invite for an upcoming conference.

JP: He is rather unreliable, doesn't have much to say, and always takes a long time to say it.

KK: Next.

Here KK need not resolve the demonstrative reference beyond the very early levels, that is, beyond an utterance-bounded description of what JP says: JP's remark is true iff the person he refers to with 'he' has a number of undesirable characteristics. JP implicates that he believes KK will not want to invite this person.

In these three demonstrations KK understands what JP intends to convey, even if in two of them he doesn't arrive to an expressive description of what is said by JP. He only needs a description of what JP said that interacts with other
factors so that they produce the intended implicature. One always has some
utterance-bound description of what is said to get started, based on semantics,
even if one does not know very much at all about the utterance.

To sum up, the description that a hearer needs to have of what the speaker
says in order to figure out implicatures varies from case to case, and need not,
and in some cases should not, be the sort of utterance-independent
characterization that goes with the most full and objective understanding of what
is said. All that semantics needs to provide, in order to provide a hook for the
pragmatic reasoning, is a description of what is said in terms the reflexive truth-
conditions of the utterance. And, as we have tried to show, semantics does
provide such a descriptive proposition, and not only an ‘incomplete logical
form,’ ‘semantic skeleton,’ ‘semantic template,’ ‘propositional schema’, ‘sub-
proposition’ or ‘incomplete proposition’, as proponents of (one version of) the
linguistic underdeterminacy thesis maintain. Semantics does provide a full truth-
evaluable proposition, albeit a reflexive one, answering to an utterance-bound
description of what is said.

§9. A Funeral

In this section we look at an example involving the domain of a quantifier
phrase.

X has died. X was an associate of both KK and JM. KK doesn’t much
want to go to the funeral. JM says, (utterance u) ‘Everyone should be there!!!’ JM
is thinking of the domain of Basque philosophers who are in Donostia at the
time.

To know what JM has said, KK should identify the domain JM was
thinking about at the domain of Basque philosophers in Donostia at the time.
Some pragmatists think this is a matter of 'saturation of hidden indexicals,' others
that it is a matter of identifying an unarticulated constituent, others see it as a
case of enrichment. We won't take a stand on this. Our point is that KK need not
arrive at an utterance-independent description of this domain to grasp JM's
implicature.

KK reasons:

i) \( u \) is true iff \( \exists D, \) such that D is the domain that the speaker of \( u \) is
implicitly referring to & everyone in D should be at the funeral.
(Knowledge of English)

ii) Given that JM is the speaker of \( u \), \( u \) is true iff \( \exists D, \) such that D is the
domain that JM is implicitly referring to & everyone in D should be at the
funeral.

iii) Given that JM is authoritative, \( \exists D, \) such that D is the domain that JM of \( u \)
is implicitly referring to & everyone in D should be at the funeral.

iv) Given that JM is being relevant, \( \exists D, \) such that D is the domain that JM is
implicitly referring to & everyone in D should be at the funeral and \textit{I am a}
\textit{member} of D.

v) I'll go to the funeral
Here KK’s reasoning has completely avoided the cognitive burden of figuring out that JM was implicitly referring to Basque philosophers who were in Donostia at the time. Given his deference to JM’s opinions on such matters, this would have been an unrewarding inferential detour, a long way of getting to the conclusion that he ought to go to the funeral.

In this case, KK’s reasoning stays near the level of reflexive truth-conditions. It may be that the force of JM’s words would be lost if he went further than this. That is, the only mode of presentation of Basque philosophers who are now in Donostia that would play an effective role in KK’s reasoning, and issue in the conclusion that he ought to go to the funeral, is Domain of people such that JM has said that they should all be at the funeral.

This example shows that the hearer’s understanding of what is said that best serves the purposes of the speaker may not constitute the sort of understanding that counts as ‘knowing what was said.’ What is important about the domain, as far as KK is concerned, is not which domain it is, but that it is a domain KK belongs to, and which JM takes to be such that all members of it should attend the funeral. KK may not know exactly what JM said, but he knows exactly what he meant to implicate.

The determination of quantifier domains has been widely discussed as to whether it should count as the result of either saturation, completion or expansion in the process of getting from the ‘incomplete logical form’ or ‘non-truth-evaluable propositional radical’ provided by the conventional meaning of the
sentence uttered to the expressive description of what is said. We argue here that such an expressive description is not needed, in the first place, for the inference of the relevant implicature. In this case, what semantics needs to deliver is an utterance bound-description of what is said of the sort we imagined KK starting his reasoning with in step i); a description what constitutes a complete truth-evaluable proposition, albeit a reflexive one, available as the input of pragmatic processes.

§10. Names

Now we move to a case in which two parties to a conversation understand the proposition expressed by a third in a completely knowledgeable and expressive way. To figure out the conversational intentions of the speaker, however, they must use pragmatic reasoning to get to more utterance-bound descriptions of what has been said.

Here is the situation. GM and KK are both at a conference. JP has wanted them to meet each other for a long time, and has told each about the other, and their common philosophical interests and tastes. He realizes that although they are talking to each other, neither knows who the other one is. He walks up and says, 'KK is talking to GM.' Both GM and KK can identify exactly what JP has said. His intention is to introduce them, to get each to know the name of the other.

Pragmatic reasoning, guided by the search for conversational appropriateness, is required to understand what JP is trying to convey. GM is intended to think 'KK is the very person is talking to me.' KK is intended to think 'My goodness gracious, I am talking to GM'. In this example, the thinkers arrive at the useful description of what has been said by starting with a completely utterance-independent description—that KK is talking to GM—and then reasoning back to a more relevant but less objective description.

§11. Conclusions

Above we quoted remarks of Grice which make it sound that knowing what is said is a necessary first step in figuring out implicatures. He also said,

'...the implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by "putting it that way".' (Grice 1967/1989, p. 39).

So it is not simply what the speaker says, but how he says it, that is crucial. But given this, the hearer must not simply arrive at some way or another of describing what is said, but one that connects with circumstances and conversational maxims, as illustrated by all of our examples.

The process of finding implicatures does need not begin with the identification of what is said. It can begin with a possibly quite lean description that is the output of a pristine semantic module, which deals with no specific facts about the utterance except the types of expressions involved. The description can be replete with quantified clauses, quantifying over the speaker
of the utterance, the time of the utterance, the conversation of which the
utterance is a part, various defaults, unarticulated constituents, values of hidden
indexicals, and the like. All of these factors are brought in by the meanings of the
expressions used, but their values are not determined by the meanings of those
expressions. The description describes what is said by an utterance in terms of
the truth-conditions of the utterance, but does not provide the proposition
expressed. Semantics does not determine what is said, and knowledge of
semantics does not allow us to know what is said, whether it is us or someone
else that says it. To know that, we need to know, in addition, a lot about
intentions, our own if we are the speaker, the speakers if we are not, and other
facts about the context of the utterance.

Most, if not all, positions in the debate of contemporary pragmatics on the
concept of what is said share two basic inter-related assumptions linked to
linguistic underdetermination: (i) that knowing the conventional meaning of the
sentence uttered does not, usually, determine a full-fledged truth-evaluable
proposition and, therefore, (ii) that pragmatic processes are required to get at a
full or complete proposition that would then serve (or not, depending of which
position you defend) as the input for the inference of implicatures. As we saw,
the second assumption seems attributable to Grice. He requires on the part of the
hearer at least an expressive description of what has been said, and this is not
fixed by the conventional meaning of the utterance. But he never claims anything
similar to (i). On the contrary, as we noted above, in discussing the case of an
utterance of 'He was in the grip of a vice', he notes that what knowledge of the
English language by itself delivers, would fall far short of a full identification of what is said. We disagree with Grice himself, then, only about point ii).

This disagreement is within a larger agreement about the importance of the distinction between what is said and what is implicated. The distinction remains important even if both what is said and what is implicated are determined in part by factors that go beyond what is provided by semantics, and for the identification of which the hearer must use pragmatic reasoning.

All action has a structure; one achieves a result by achieving another result, in certain circumstances. Our repertoire of basic actions, of basic ways we can move our bodies and their parts, combined with knowledge of what the results will be in various circumstances, allow us to plan and execute a great many actions with a relatively limited number of movements.

In language, we make noises and thereby utter words and thereby say things and thereby produce all sorts of changes in people's minds and thereby bring about a lot of other stuff. At each stage, different sorts of circumstances are exploited to obtain results: facts about mouths, facts about air, facts about ears, facts about linguistic cultures and phones, facts about conventions, facts about the way people's minds are organized.

The difference between saying and implicating corresponds to a major break between the sorts of circumstances on which one relies to achieve one's ends. What we say depends largely on the sounds we utter, the language we speak, its conventional meanings, and contextual factors tied to our own minds—what we are looking at, thinking of, and the like. The changes we produce in how others act depends on quite different circumstances, about how
they will react to learning that the world is as we say it is, or at least learning that
we think it is this way, or want them to think so. It is a miracle that we can fairly
reliably say what we intend to by making noises. And it is a miracle we can get
people to do things by saying things. But they are different miracles.

Pragmatics is not a module that takes what is said as input and produces
implicatures as output. It is rather bringing to bear all that we know about the
world and hearers in it in order to plan linguistic actions that will have the
results we desire, and bringing all that we know about the world and the
speakers in it to interpret speech. If semantics is conceived as the study of non-
natural, conventional meanings of expressions and structures, it is an important
part of pragmatics. If semantics is conceived as the study of all meaning, natural
and non-natural, as the study of how parts of the world, including but not
limited to the intentional acts of humans, can provide information about other
parts, then pragmatics is a part of semantics.

But, to return to our main theme, the dilemma pragmatics and semantics
have lived with for at least forty years is false. A pristine semantics determines
constraints on the truth-conditions of utterances, and understanding of semantics
allows us to describe the truth-conditions of utterances, and so what is said, in
terms of these constraints. That is all Gricean pragmatics needs from semantics.

References


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